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ABSTRACT
Nietzsche’s conception of eros and its role in the development of philosophers is similar to the
conception of those same topics espoused by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Nietzsche and
Diotima agree that eros is an insatiable desire to possess the beautiful, that eros aims at
immortality through reproduction, and that philosophy requires an ascent beyond sexual desire to
“higher” forms of eros, which nevertheless are still modeled on heterosexual reproduction.
Understanding these facets of Nietzsche’s view leads to an apparent contradiction in that
Nietzsche thinks of philosophy on the model of reproduction and ascribes to the philosopher both
the female and the male roles in heterosexual reproduction. I argue that this ambivalence reflects
Nietzsche’s view that practicing philosophy requires balancing two conflicting philosophical
tendencies: on the one hand, pursuit of truth, which involves dissatisfaction with oneself; on the
other hand, creation, which involves acknowledgment of one’s own capacity and value.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates recounts a conversation with a “wise woman of Mantinea”
named Diotima (201d). 1 Socrates says that it was Diotima who taught him “the art of love” – a
lesson Socrates greatly appreciated, since he says in the Symposium “the only thing I say I
understand is the art of love” (177e). 2 We know that Nietzsche took Socrates’ self-evaluation
seriously.3 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche envisions the aftermath of Plato’s Symposium, when
Socrates leaves at dawn, “while behind him on the benches and on the floor his fellow carousers
remained behind asleep, dreaming of Socrates, the true eroticist” (BT 13). At the other end of his
productive life, Nietzsche makes clear that Socrates’ erotic prowess extends beyond the
dreamworld, saying “Socrates was a great erotic” (TI II 8).
Nietzsche engaged extensively with both Socrates and Plato and did so in a nuanced and
multifaceted way. On the whole, however, Nietzsche tends to adopt a critical and even antagonistic
relationship toward both. In the preface of Beyond Good and Evil he says that “the worst, most
prolonged, and most dangerous of all errors” was “Plato’s invention of pure spirit and the Good in
itself,” and also insinuates that Socrates might be responsible for Plato’s error (BGE Preface). 4
Surprisingly, given his frequent criticism of Plato, Nietzsche’s conception of eros and its role in
the development of philosophers is similar to the conception of those same topics espoused by
Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. Nietzsche and Diotima are in agreement that eros is an insatiable

1

All translations of Plato’s Symposium are by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff, in Cooper 1997. Actually, the story of
the Symposium is recounted by Apollodorus, many years after the alleged discussion between Socrates and the other
celebrants at the symposium. However, there is not space here to examine the significance of this “frame narrative.”
2 Socrates also claims in the Phaedrus to possess an “erotic art” (257a).
3 According to Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche designated the Symposium as his Lieblingsdichtung when graduating
from school (Kaufmann 1984: 474).
4
Walter Kaufmann argues that Socrates was, in fact, a model for Nietzsche (Kaufmann 1984). Kaufmann suggests
that Nietzsche’s animosity toward Plato has mistakenly led commentators to overlook Nietzsche’s deep agreement
with and admiration for Socrates. Nevertheless, even Kaufmann admits that Nietzsche felt obligated to distance
himself from Socrates and criticize Socrates (Kaufmann 1984: 479).
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desire to possess what is beautiful, that eros aims at immortality through reproduction, and that
philosophy and other great cultural achievements require an ascent beyond sexual desire to
“higher” forms of eros, which nevertheless are still modeled on heterosexual reproduction.
Understanding these facets of Nietzsche’s view helps to make sense of Nietzsche’s comments on
the development of philosophers, the agonistic nature of eros, and the hostile relationship between
men and women. However, such an understanding also leads to an apparent contradiction in that
Nietzsche thinks of philosophy on the model of reproduction and ascribes to the philosopher both
the female and the male roles in heterosexual reproduction. I argue that Nietzsche’s ambivalence
about whether philosophers are essentially like men or like women reflects his view that
philosophical development requires balancing two conflicting philosophical tendencies: on the one
hand, pursuit of truth, which is motivated by desire and therefore involves dissatisfaction with
oneself; on the other hand, the ability to create, which involves acknowledgment of one’s own
capacity and value. In my view, the affinity between Nietzsche and Diotima has been overlooked
and recognizing this affinity affords a better understanding of Nietzsche’s metaphilosophical
views.

2

THE LADDER OF LOVE

We can begin to see the similarities between Nietzsche and Diotima when we consider two
claims at the heart of Diotima’s lesson on eros. First, she claims that lovers want to possess
whatever it is that they love forever. Second, she claims that those who are “pregnant in soul” (a
phrase of Diotima’s, which I will later explain in more detail) should move on from ordinary love
of human bodies upwards through love of customs and knowledge until finally reaching love of
the beautiful itself. The hierarchy involved in the second of these lessons is often called Diotima’s
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scala amoris or “ladder of love.” This ascent, which subordinates the physical to some ethereal
“in-itself,” looks antithetical to Nietzsche’s philosophical project, because Nietzsche explicitly
formulated that project in opposition to the “otherworldliness” of Platonism. Though I will
ultimately argue that this conflict is merely apparent, there are certainly good reasons why some
have seen Diotima and Nietzsche as in conflict.
Robert Pippin, for example, considers Nietzsche and Diotima to be in significant
disagreement. According to Pippin, Diotima’s account implies that the lower rungs of the ladder
must be unsatisfying if individuals are to be spurred “upwards” toward the beautiful itself (Pippin
2001: 89). Pippin says that “Diotima’s defense of such a claim rests on something that Nietzsche
is most concerned to attack: the assumption that no one could find sexual satisfaction in such a
body, or any finite, limited delight in the beautiful, ultimately satisfying” (Pippin 2001: 89). The
ladder seems to involve striving toward a perfect love – a love beyond particularity and
temporality. In Pippin’s view, such an idealized conception of love is precisely what Nietzsche is
mocking when he calls philosophers clumsy and inexperienced lovers (Pippin 2001: 90; BGE
Preface). A competent lover would not be so insecure as to demand guarantees of the eternal
possession of the beloved. Pippin holds that for Nietzsche, “the so-called ascent described by
Diotima is not an ascent but a diversion of eros, away from what can only be enjoyed with great
risk and uncertainty, toward what will satisfy souls already so fearful, even contemptuous of time
and finitude” (Pippin 2001: 89-90).
Laurence Lampert, similarly, interprets Diotima and Nietzsche as deeply opposed to one
another. In the course of interpreting Leo Strauss’s Note on the Plan of Beyond Good and Evil
(1973), Lampert identifies “dogmatic Platonism” with “Diotima’s Platonism” (Lampert 1996: 28).
In light of Nietzsche’s explicit and vehement opposition to dogmatic Platonism, Diotima thus
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becomes Nietzsche’s antagonist. Lampert and Pippin both allow for the possibility that Diotima is
not representative of Plato’s views. They both suggest that a subtler interpretation of the
Symposium or of Plato’s dialogues in general might reveal a more human understanding of love,
one that is more compatible with Nietzsche’s own perspective on eros. 5 However, I will argue that
even in the words of Diotima herself (as recalled by Socrates, as reported by Aristodemus, as told
by Apollodorus, as written by Plato) there are several fundamental tenets with which Nietzsche
agrees.
Diotima sets the stage for ascent by asking Socrates what the lover of beautiful things
desires. Socrates answers that the lover of beautiful things desires that beautiful things “become
his own” (204d). Love, according to Diotima, is the desire to possess. Similarly, Nietzsche says,
“sexual love… is what most clearly reveals itself as a craving for new property,” but he also
suggests that nearly all love is essentially such a “craving for new property,” only slightly less
clearly revealed (GS 14). 6 He writes, “Greed and love: such different feelings these terms evoke!
And yet it could be the same instinct, named twice” (GS 14). Thus, Nietzsche and Diotima agree
that erotic desires are impulses toward possession.
Knowing the goal of eros, we can evaluate what Diotima and Nietzsche both say about the
conditions under which the goal can be achieved and eros satisfied. Diotima says that Eros desires
good and beautiful things because he lacks them (202d) and that “anything he finds his way to
always slips away” (203e).7 Pippin is clearly right that Diotima’s account makes nearly all erotic

5

In 1864, the young Nietzsche himself wrote a very short essay arguing that the Symposium should be interpreted
holistically and with sensitivity to its dramatic characteristics (see Nietzsche, 1864 in bibliography). I do think there
is something extremely important to be said about Nietzsche’s understanding of the distance between Plato and
Platonism, but to quote Pippin “doing so would lead us quickly into many issues in Plato” (Pippin 2001: 90). I want
to confine myself as much as possible to Nietzsche and, more importantly, I think that the affinity between
Nietzsche and Diotima has been overlooked.
6
I say “nearly” because Nietzsche suggests one rare exception to the greediness of love: friendship (GS 14).
7
Here I capitalize Eros because Diotima is describing the daimon or spirit Eros using the language of
personification. However, this description of the daimon is intended to shed light on the phenomenon of eros.
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relationships out to be unsatisfying; I do not think, however, that Pippin is right to claim this feature
of Diotima’s eros as a point of disagreement between her and Nietzsche. Nietzsche in fact seems
to echo Diotima when he says, “We slowly grow tired of the old, of what we safely possess, and
we stretch out our hands again; even the most beautiful landscape is no longer sure of our love
after we have lived in it for three months… possession usually diminishes the possession” (GS
14). There are myriad passages in which Nietzsche advises both men and women that they will
remain attractive to a particular lover only so long as they remain somehow outside the full grasp
of that lover. These passages, to which I will return in the second section of this paper, indicate
Nietzsche’s belief that eros is essentially a striving and cannot be maintained once a person has
attained what they were striving for. Nietzsche and Diotima certainly must differ in their
explanations of why eros cannot be satisfied, since Nietzsche’s explanation cannot involve
anything like the Platonic forms, but the importance of that difference can only be appreciated
after grasping their agreement on the insatiability of eros.
For Diotima, eros is so insatiable that it ultimately ends in a desire to possess its object
forever (206a). Such eternal possession is possible only on the basis of immortality, and so eros
aims to “give birth in beauty,” because reproduction is the closest human approximation of
immortality (206e-207a). Whatever object is desired, immortality is the aim of eros. 8 The
distinction between the object of erotic desire and its aim is evident in the fact that we can ask why
a person wants to possess the object of their desire (Fine 2020: 14).
Though the aim of all eros is to achieve immortality by giving birth, Diotima distinguishes
between those pregnant in body, who are destined to strive for immortality through actual sexual

See Fine 2020 for the distinction Diotima makes between the object and the aim of erotic desire: “The object is the
intensional description under which something is desired. The aim is what one’s desire is ultimately directed toward,
whether desired under that description or not” (Fine 2020: 14).
8
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reproduction, and those pregnant in soul, who are destined to give birth to works of art, ideas, and
theories.9 According to Diotima, those who are by nature pregnant in soul should proceed upwards
through several stages of loving. First, they should love one beautiful body, eventually all beautiful
bodies, then beautiful customs, then various beautiful kinds of knowledge, then finally Beauty
itself. Pippin is right that the lower kinds of love must here be unsatisfying in order to spur the
would-be philosopher upwards, but it is also true that Diotima views each step on this upward
journey as good and necessary. Similarly, to be pregnant in soul is clearly superior in Diotima’s
view, but it is important that Diotima believes both forms of pregnancy are honorable: “when a
man and a woman come together in order to give birth, this is a godly affair. Pregnancy,
reproduction – this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do” (206c).
Nietzsche similarly holds that the greediness of eros aims ultimately at reproduction. He
says of Schopenhauer “he thinks that the drive to procreate is negated by beauty,” but Nietzsche
says in response to Schopenhauer “someone is contradicting you, and I am afraid it is nature. Why
are the tones, colors, smells, and rhythmic movement of nature beautiful in the first place? What
does beauty bring out?” (TI IX 22). The clear implication is that the real purpose of beauty is to
incite sexual desire and reproduction. Nietzsche even alludes to Diotima’s speech in order to
counter Schopenhauer’s claim that beauty is a respite from sexuality, suggesting she might be right
that beauty is a temptation to procreate “from the most sensual all the way up to the most spiritual”
(TI IX 22). Then, in TI IX 23, Nietzsche writes:
Plato goes even further. He says, with an innocence that only a Greek could have
(and not a “Christian”), that there could never have been a Platonic philosophy
without such beautiful young men in Athens: the sight of them is what first puts the
philosopher’s soul in an erotic rapture and won’t let it rest until it has sunk the seed
Diotima does say at 206c that “all of us are pregnant both in body and in soul” but later, at 208e-209a, plainly says
that “some people are pregnant in body… while others are pregnant in soul.” It may be that all people have some
degree of potential for both types of pregnancy, but those she calls “pregnant in soul” are “those who are even more
pregnant in their souls than in their bodies” (209a).
9
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of all high things into such beautiful soil. Another bizarre saint! – You cannot
believe your ears, even if you can believe Plato.
He goes on to say, “I still remember, against Schopenhauer and in Plato’s honor, that the
whole higher culture and literature of classical France also grew on the ground of sexual interest”
(TI IX 23). Nietzsche is against Schopenhauer here, and he suggests that you can believe Plato’s
claims about the sexual origins of philosophy.
Of course, the picture of desire as insatiable, appropriative, and born from lack is very
Schopenhauerian. Given that Nietzsche largely agreed with Schopenhauer’s vision of a world of
striving and suffering, the similarity of this vision of desire to Schopenhauer’s might constitute
more evidence that Nietzsche would not have straightforwardly opposed Diotima’s view.
Nietzsche disagrees with Schopenhauer, though, that we ought to reject desire merely because it
has such a character. Nietzsche, like Diotima, wants to acknowledge the fact that higher culture
and philosophy originate out of sexual desire. As Maudemarie Clark describes it, in Nietzsche’s
view, the initial drive to theorize stems from a desire to “appropriate the foreign” (Clark 2015:
148; BGE 230). As we have seen, such a desire to appropriate is precisely what eros is. In the case
of the philosopher, this desire is even so strong as to want to assimilate, incorporate, or digest the
objects of its desire (BGE 230). Here “the foreign” means whatever a person does not yet have.
Just as a beloved or a landscape is more alluring the more unknown they are, the suggestion is that
the same dynamic is what motivates knowledge. 10 In saying this about philosophers, Nietzsche
reemphasizes that these “needs and abilities are the same ones that physiologists have established
for everything that lives, grows, and propagates” (BGE 230). That is, again, philosophy is
motivated by the same “base” drives that maintain and propagate life.

10

Because Diotima also holds that eros is the desire for something you do not yet have, insofar as Diotima claims
that philosophy is a form of eros, she also holds that philosophy is a desire to appropriate the foreign.

8
However, just as it was important to emphasize for Diotima that the lower rungs of the
ladder from sexual desire to philosophy are still honorable, it is important that Nietzsche believes
that philosophy and higher culture require growing beyond the sexual, rising to the level of the
spiritual – the soul cannot be contented with interest in beautiful bodies. The initial sexual desire
and then romantic love is necessary to start the journey toward philosophy, but Nietzsche also
notes that it is important that philosophers “not be stuck to any person, not even somebody we love
best” (BGE 41). What’s more, the philosopher must not become stuck to their homeland or “some
field of study” (BGE 41). Nietzsche expresses this concern in GS 285, where he says, “no more
resting place stands open for your heart.” He there uses the metaphor of a lake that rose higher
when it “formed a dam where it used to flow off” (GS 285). Mirroring Diotima’s “ladder of love,”
we can see here Nietzsche’s concern that would-be philosophers will become “stuck” on some
lower object of love, failing to proceed to a higher form of the “spiritualization of sensuality” (TI
V 3). Nietzsche says that for the sake of truth, “the thinker must always from time to time drive
away those people he loves… so that they may display their sting and malice and cease to seduce
him” (D 479). In GS 285, when Nietzsche says that “no more resting place stands open for your
heart” he also says that in order to dam yourself up you must, “arm yourself against any ultimate
peace” and “will the eternal recurrence of war and peace.” Driving away loved ones is not meant
to extirpate love or desire, in fact it will likely enhance it, given Nietzsche’s view that we can only
desire what is unfamiliar, what we lack. Denying oneself access to readily attainable objects of
desire is like damming oneself up, reigniting desire by aiming it at new and higher objects. Erotic
desire is both necessary and necessarily frustrated in the course of developing a higher spirituality.
Such necessities go some way to explaining why Nietzsche says that philosophers have
always avoided and should always avoid marriage and sex (GM III 7-8). Clark notes that this claim
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of Nietzsche’s, made in the context of expositing the priestly origins of philosophy, is commonly
understood as a merely practical concern about the conditions most conducive to philosophizing,
suggesting Nietzsche believes that marriage interferes with the philosopher’s need to be left alone
to get work done and sexual desire distracts from intellectual work (Clark 2017: 104). I don’t
necessarily disagree with this common interpretation but merely want to note that Nietzsche, in
this passage, is also making a separate point about the relationship between philosophy and
sexuality.11 He says, “as for the ‘chastity’ of philosophers, this kind of spirit obviously has its
fruitfulness somewhere other than in children; perhaps elsewhere also the continued existence of
their name, their little immortality” (GM III 8). Thus, it is not desire that is problematic for
philosophers, but only certain expressions of it. We also see in this quote from GM III 8 an implied
connection between reproduction and immortality. Whereas most people might seek “their little
immortality” through children, philosophers seek it in another way. Elsewhere, Nietzsche says, “to
create things on which time will try its teeth to no avail; to be concerned in form, in substance with
a little immortality—I was never humble enough to demand less of myself” (TI IX 51). Thus,
Nietzsche and Diotima are in agreement that eros is an insatiable desire for possession of what is
beautiful, that eros aims at immortality through reproduction, and that those pregnant in spirit
should ascend to higher objects of desire and new forms of fruitfulness.
As Suzanne Obdrzalek has noted, the insistence that carnal desire should be transcended
makes Diotima’s ladder appear so excessively ascetic that much recent scholarship on the
Symposium has been motivated by a desire to find an interpretation which lessens Diotima’s

11

Clark, while offering a reading of this passage that is in many ways similar to my own, must, I think, have a
different conception of spiritualization or sublimation than the one I am utilizing here. She suggests that the ascetic
ideal can only be overcome by “drawing the erotic drives into philosophizing and finding ways to give them
sublimated satisfaction therein” and concludes that avoidance of marriage and sex is not a necessary trait for
Nietzsche’s philosophers (Clark 2017: 132, 126). I, on the other hand, take the ascetic practices of avoiding marriage
and sex to be aids in the achievement of sublimation. If marriage and sex are not avoided, it seems to me that
sublimation has not taken place, as the sex drive is continuing to express itself in its original form.
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asceticism (Obdrzalek 2010: 437). Obdrzalek resolves this interpretive difficulty by simply
accepting that Diotima is an ascetic, but such a “solution” is not possible in Nietzsche’s case, since
he is emphatically opposed to asceticism. It is true that Nietzsche says, “a certain asceticism… a
hard and lighthearted renunciation with the best of intentions, belongs to the most favorable
conditions of the highest spirituality” (GM III 9). This is not, however, a pernicious asceticism of
the kind Nietzsche opposes, because “sensuality is thus not suspended… but rather only
transfigures itself and no longer enters consciousness as a sexual stimulus” (GM III 8). 12 The
philosopher’s “asceticism” raises the sights of desire in service of a higher fruitfulness, whereas
the ascetic priest is totally forbidden any form of reproduction and aims to repress rather than
elevate desire (GM III 11). Having said this, there is still a danger of excessive self-denial in the
philosopher’s asceticism, even if such asceticism serves to help realize a greater productive
potential. I will return to this danger in Section IV.
One way to understand why the “spiritualization” of eros need not be ascetic is to grasp
that, while the erotic drive may at one time take a person for its object and at another time take the
truth for its object, it nevertheless remains the same drive. 13 The erotic drive is not repressed in the
course of the ascent, rather it is sublimated, in approximately the Freudian sense of being redirected
from a purely sexual expression to some other outlet (though, as Ken Gemes has astutely noted
“often, but not always, sublimations have repressions as antecedents”; Gemes 2009: 48).
Nietzsche’s view of sublimation is not identical to Freud’s and Nietzsche did not use the term
“sublimation” to refer to this phenomenon whereby a drive is redirected (Gemes 2009: 56, note
16). Nonetheless, Nietzsche does distinguish between individuals who can restrain a drive by

12

I think that the same can be said for Diotima, as eros is at each stage in the ascent still eros. However, there is a
much stronger interpretive motivation to overcome the charge of asceticism in Nietzsche’s case.
13
Perhaps Diotima is making a similar point in saying that all desire is eros (205d). Given the analogy to poetry and
creation, however, Diotima’s point may just be that eros can be used synechdochally for desire.
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turning the strength of the drive towards another end, and those who repress their drives by
attempting to weaken or eradicate them (Gemes 2009: 47-48). The distinction between repression
and sublimation is evident in TI V 1-2: “The Church combats the passions by cutting them off in
every sense: its technique, its ‘cure’, is castration. It never asks: ‘how can a desire be spiritualized,
beautified, deified?’” (TI V 1).

3

EROTIC AGON AND THE WAR OF THE SEXES

If we take Nietzsche’s ladder of love to be similar to Diotima’s, we are naturally brought
to consider the relationship between men and women, because the view takes all eros to be
modeled on sexual reproduction, in that it aims at giving birth. As we have seen, the desire depicted
in the ascent is unidirectional. There is a lover and a beloved and it is only the desire of the lover
that matters for determining whether an erotic relationship exists between a person and something
or someone else. That the beloved person can be replaced by such non-sentient beauties as a law
or a landscape makes evident that the beloved is merely the passive object of the lover.
For Nietzsche, these active and passive roles are associated with masculinity and
femininity, respectively. 14 In BGE 206 Nietzsche says that a genius is “a being that either begets
or gives birth,” these two alternatives being “the two most valuable acts performed by humanity.”

14

In my view, the text suggests that this is true for Diotima as well. For Diotima, higher forms of eros are supposed
to aim at a production that is analogous to sexual reproduction and therefore it seems that the archetypal erotic
relationship is that between a man and a woman. Though homoerotic relationships are central to the Symposium,
even these relationships are, I think, supposed to be understood in terms analogous to reproduction through
heterosexual relationships. If that is Diotima’s view, it would not be unique to her; in ancient Athens, one of the two
partners in relationships between two men was often called womanly, so that there was still a masculine and a
feminine position even in relationships between two men (Foucault 1984: 46-47; Robson 2013: 58). The
presumption was that being the passive object of a lover, or attempting to make oneself into such an object through
beautification, was womanly (Robson 2013: 60-61). The important point, though, is Diotima’s non-reciprocal
conception of eros, which involves an active lover and a passive beloved. The two poles of that non-reciprocal
relation are, at least for Nietzsche, associated with men and women, respectively.
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In BGE 248 he elaborates, saying that those geniuses who “let themselves be impregnated,” a
phrase which Nietzsche himself puts in quotation marks, “inherit the female problem of pregnancy
and the secret task of forming, ripening, and bringing to completion.” In GS 72, the task of
pregnancy is associated with being “gentler, more patient, more timid, more pleased to submit.”
Such female genius is juxtaposed to the begetting type of genius, “peoples tortured and delighted
by unknown fevers who irresistibly leave themselves, loving and lusting after foreign races” (BGE
248).15 Similarly, in BGE 209 the “skepticism of a bold masculinity” is associated with “the genius
for war and conquest,” voyages of discovery, appropriation, and possession. Recall also my
description above of how antagonism and readiness for war are necessary for maintaining and
elevating desire. Masculinity is thereby associated with being a lover, one who desires possession,
while femininity is associated with both pregnancy and passivity. We find this dichotomy pithily
expressed in GS 68, where a wise man tells a boy “the way of men is will; the way of women is
willingness.”
The equation of male with activity and female with passivity is, of course, an old sexist
trope, not at all unique to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s picture is not so simple as that, however. While
he thinks women are in some sense passive, he takes this to be part of a strategy that women adopt
to achieve comfort and security (GS 66, HAH I 356, 412, BGE 239). Women make themselves
into the image that men expect of them and so must be active in playing the passive role (Abbey
1996: 242; Derrida 1979: 109). Nietzsche thus frequently compares women to actresses.
Nevertheless, Nietzsche does maintain a certain dichotomy between the feminine type of
genius who is fundamentally characterized by pregnancy and masculine geniuses who “leave

BGE 248 is in fact a description of the begetting/begetter dichotomy as it applies to “peoples of genius,” such as
the Greeks, French, Romans, and Jews. However, the first and last sentences of the passage make it evident, I think,
that the description might just as well apply to individual geniuses. In BGE 209, Nietzsche does not distinguish
between the masculinity of Frederick the Great and the masculinity of the Germans as a people.
15
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themselves, loving and lusting” after what is other. 16 The presumption, evident in Nietzsche’s
famous metaphor of truth as a woman, is that a philosopher is like a man pursuing a woman (BGE
Preface, GS Preface 4). Philosophical eros, like all eros, is understood on the model of heterosexual
desire because eros is supposed to aim at a sort of giving birth that is analogous to the reproduction
of individuals and of the species. On this heterosexual model, maleness is connected to externallydirected pursuit, i.e. to being a lover, and femaleness is connected to the internal condition of
pregnancy and to the passive role of beloved.
Given the central role that the erotic relationship between the sexes has in Nietzsche’s
conceptualization of philosophy, and given the immense importance for Nietzsche of philosophy,
this most valuable product of higher culture, his comments on the relationship between men and
women should be understood in the context of his belief that desire is the route to philosophy. In
the first sentence of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche proclaims “the immediate certainty of the
view that the continuing development of art is tied to the duality of the Appollonian and the
Dionysian: just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, which are engaged in a continual
struggle interrupted only by temporary periods of reconciliation.” In BGE 238, Nietzsche suggests
it would be wrong “to deny the most abysmal antagonism and the necessity of an eternally hostile
tension” between man and woman. On the other hand, someone who is right about this
“fundamental problem of ‘man and woman’” will be “someone who has the same depth in his

Here I have changed the word “foreign” into the word “other” to highlight the fact that Nietzsche means foreign
both in the sense of unfamiliar and in the sense of ontologically distinct. There is a basic ontological distinction
between oneself and others, and words like conquest or incorporation seem to suggest erasing that disinction by
turning something external into a part of oneself (as is suggested by the metaphor of empire). But I am arguing that
Nietzsche views such conquest as motivated by essentially the same force that attracts someone to an alluring
stranger or drives adventurers to seek out new landscapes. Familiarization, possession, conquest, and incorporation
may each be different in degree and connotation, but they are fundamentally similar to one another. Nietzsche puts a
friendlier face on this tendency in Daybreak 532, entitled “love makes the same,” where he says “love wants to spare
the person to whom it dedicates itself every feeling of being other, and consequently it is full of dissumulation and
pretence of similarity.”
16
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spirit as he does in his desires,” i.e., someone capable of spiritualizing his desire. Such a person
“needs to understand the woman as a possession,” that is, as an object of desire. Eternally hostile
tension is necessary because eros survives only so long as such tension exists (see above p. 5 on
the necessity of tension and p. 8 on the necessity of hostility). The tension necessary for eros
requires an “othering” of the beloved. Nietzsche expresses the importance of such distance in GS
60, titled “Women and their action at a distance”: “the magic and the most powerful effect of
women is, to speak the language of the philosophers, action at a distance, actio in distans: but that
requires, first and foremost – distance!” (GS 60). According to both Diotima and Nietzsche,
comfortability, the sense that the object of desire is within one’s grasp, causes desire to ebb. At
least for Nietzsche, erotic desire must not ebb, because it is necessary for both life and philosophy.
Nietzsche indicates that in proclaiming an eternal war between the sexes, he is thinking above all
of the interests of philosophers: “Did anyone have ears for my definition of love? It is the only one
worthy of a philosopher. – Love – its method is warfare, its foundation is the deadly hatred between
the sexes” (EH III 5).
The view of love as a struggle is another point where Nietzsche acknowledges his
agreement with the Platonic Socrates. Nietzsche says that the reason Socrates fascinated those
around him was that he had discovered, in dialectics, “a new type of agon,” an erotic agon (TI II
8). In the passage mentioned above, where Nietzsche “honors” Plato over and against
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche says that “philosophy á la Plato is more accurately defined as an erotic
contest” (TI IX 23). This would also be an accurate definition of philosophy á la Nietzsche.

4

FEMININE PHILOSOPHERS

The preceding section suggests that Nietzsche’s ladder of love relies on a sexual dichotomy
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and that philosophers adopt the male role, which is the active role of the lover pursuing a beloved.
Yet Nietzsche’s work is also full of suggestions that philosophers are like women. Nietzsche says
of “we philosophers” that “we must constantly give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and
maternally endow them with all that we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony,
conscience, fate, and disaster” (GS Preface 3). Elsewhere he describes the philosopher’s
“‘motherly’ instinct, the secret love of that which grows in him” (GM III 8). Nietzsche holds that
such “philosophical motherhood” is associated with supposedly feminine character traits:
“Pregnancy has made women gentler, more patient, more timid, more pleased to submit; and just
so does spiritual pregnancy produce the character of the contemplative type, to which the female
character is related: these are male mothers” (GS 72). Nietzsche here acknowledges the feminine
character of those spiritually pregnant people who are predisposed to philosophy.
We should recognize here how strange the talk of “male mothers” is. As I discussed in
Section II, Nietzsche often suggests that philosophers pursuing truth are like male lovers pursuing
a beloved woman. That philosophers are also portrayed as pregnant seems to conflict with the
notion that philosophers are male, collapsing male lover and pregant woman into one person. Of
course, the talk of male mothers also does not fit with any traditional biological understanding of
human reproduction. This same strangeness is present in Diotima’s story, where the philosopher
is a masculine lover and yet also pregnant. If we recall that reproduction is essential to both
Nietzsche’s and Diotima’s conceptions of eros, and that eros is for both of them central to
philosophy, then I believe that we have to see this strangeness as something more than an artefact
of a confused attempt to analogize philosophy to biology. Rather, we should see this strangeness
as an important problem to untangle in order to understand Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy.
There are even suggestions that motherhood is an answer to Nietzsche’s central problem
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of how to justify existence in the face of suffering, without turning to asceticism (posed, e.g., in
GM III 28).17 At the conclusion of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche describes the Hellenic
“mysteries of sexuality” which according to Nietzsche venerated “procreation, pregnancy, and
birth” (TI X 4). Nietzsche claims that these mysteries guaranteed to the Hellenes “eternal life, the
eternal return of life… the triumphal yes to life over and above all death and change…” (TI X 4).
He goes on to say that “in the doctrine of the mysteries, pain is pronounced holy: the ‘woes of
woman in labor’ sanctify pain in general,” and that “there has to be an eternal ‘agony of the woman
in labor’ so that there can be an eternal joy of creation, so that the will to life can eternally affirm
itself” (TI X 4). Nietzsche calls these mysteries “Dionysian” and in the next section Nietzsche
declares himself “the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus” (TI X 5). Just as the mysteries
guarantee the eternal return and affirmation of life, Nietzsche declares himself “the teacher of the
eternal return” (TI X 5). These comments suggest that Nietzsche is identifying himself with the
Hellenic veneration of motherhood and its potential as a method of affirming life in the face of
suffering.
The notion that Dionysus is a philosopher is an extremely interesting one and Nietzsche
repeats this claim in the final section of Beyond Good and Evil.18 Nietzsche there describes
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Throughout On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche describes how what he calls ascetic morality came to
dominate human life to such a great extent. In brief, his theory is that ascetic morality gives meaning to the suffering
involved in life and thereby makes life bearable. However, ascetic morality, typified by the Christian belief that all
people are inherently guilty, also leads to self-hatred and hatred of life. Nietzsche therefore asks whether an alternate
meaning for existence and suffering can be found.
18
Strauss identifies Nietzsche’s claim that gods philosophize as a point of disagreement between Nietzsche and
Diotima, who says that gods do not philosophize (Strauss 1973: 189; Symposium 204a-b). However, Strauss also
acknowledges the similarities between Socrates and the description given of Dionysus in BGE 295, calling this
Dionysus a “super-Socrates” (Strauss 1973: 189). In fact, just as the “tempter god” of BGE 295 is a “genius of the
heart” and “born pied piper of consciences,” Socrates is described in GS 340 as a “love-sick [verliebte] monster and
pied piper of Athens.” EH III 6 contains a quotation of the description of the “tempter-god” from BGE 295, except
that Nietzsche adds in EH, “incidentally, I won’t allow any speculation as to who I am describing here.” Perhaps he
is describing both Socrates and Dionysus. At any rate, it seems at least possible that TI X 5 and BGE 295 are
something more like a play on Diotima’s claim that gods do not philosophize, rather than a direct contradiction of
that claim.
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Dionysus as “the tempter god,” who possesses a “genius of the heart” (BGE 295). Recalling also
the link between Dionysus and woman implied in the opening of The Birth of Tragedy, it seems
that the genius of the heart (one might say the erotic art), which belongs to the godly philosopher
of whom Nietzsche says he is a disciple, is a kind of genius Nietzsche associates with women.

5

NIETZSCHE ON BEAUTY AND ANDROGYNOUS PHILOSOPHY

At this point there are two problems that I would like to address. First, how can we make
sense of the fact that Nietzsche seems to place himself and other philosophers alternately on both
sides of the reproductive relationship that he takes to be central to philosophy? Second, even if
Pippin was wrong to place Diotima and Nietzsche in opposition to one another with respect to their
positions on the dissatisfaction inherent to eros, Pippin is right that Diotima and Nietzsche have
different explanations for the dissatisfaction. For Diotima, the trouble is that no instance of beauty
is “beauty in itself,” but Nietzsche says that “‘beauty in itself’ is an empty phrase, not even a
concept” (TI IX 19). What, then, is Nietzsche’s explanation?
First, let us examine the question of why, for Nietzsche, no object of desire satisfies eros.
Nietzsche says that “people find beauty in everything that throws their image back at them” (TI
IX 19). This phenomenon is exemplified in the above-mentioned passage on women and their
action at a distance, where Nietzsche suggests that women are like ships gliding past on the sea,
onto which men project their happier and immortalized selves (GS 60).19 Picking out an especially
desirable sea-faring woman, Nietzsche says that Greek men saw in Helen of Troy “the ideal image
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Note once again the role that immortality plays in desirability. I take Nietzsche to be saying here, as elsewhere,
that men desire women because they see in them the possibility of achieving immortality.
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of their own existence” (BT 3). 20 Whereas Diotima claims that beautiful things imperfectly partake
of beauty in itself, Nietzsche says that beautiful things merely reflect the beauty of the self. In other
words, Nietzsche’s explanation of the dissatisfaction inherent in eros is that lovers are searching
outside themselves for something that can only be found within themselves. As he says, “People
think that the world itself is overflowing with beauty, – they forget that they are its cause” (TI IX
19).
Recall that Nietzsche characterizes philosophers, insofar as they are lovers, as those who
“leave themselves, loving and lusting” after truth. In Daybreak 549 he describes what I take to be
the same intellectual tendency, associating it with conquerors and with action, as he does in BGE
248. However, whereas this appropriating tendency of the lover might sometimes be assumed to
evince the swaggering self-confidence normally associated with an Alexander or Napoleon, in the
Daybreak passage Nietzsche points out that wanting to flee from oneself might just as well signify
that these conquerors are “gloomily inclined towards themselves.” What is characterized in BGE
230 as the intellect’s tyrannical drive to incorporate, is in D 549 instead called a longing “to
dissolve into something ‘outside.’” Elsewhere, Nietzsche describes how lovers “abandon
themselves and want to be the same” as those that they love (D 532). Daybreak 516 notes that the
sort of person who “flees from himself” is engaged in self-hatred. Hence, Nietzsche declares a
desire to “seduce him into loving himself” (D 517). Self-denial is the extreme result of adopting
the viewpoint of the lover, because desiring involves placing value on something other than
oneself.
The eros that lies behind the drive to philosophize involves yearning for something outside

See also: TI I 13: “Man created woman – but out of what? Out of a rib from his God, his ideal.” and BGE 131:
“The sexes deceive themselves about each other: which means they basically only love and honor themselves (or
their own ideal, to say it more nicely – ).”
20
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oneself, “leaving oneself” in pursuit of what is other. Yet, because this feeling of lack, selfdissatisfaction, or erotic yearning is so central to the development of philosophers, they have a
strong tendency toward asceticism (GM III 7-10). In the first section of this paper I argued that
Nietzsche’s sublimation is not inherently ascetic (at least not in the pernicious sense of being
genuinely self-negating), but it turns out that Nietzsche thinks erotic desire itself has an inherent
tendency toward self-negation. That is, anyone consumed by erotic desire has a tendency toward
self-negation, whether or not that desire has been sublimated. Achieving a desire rapacious enough
to try to conquer the world through thought, that is, achieving the degree of desire Nietzsche
associates with philosophers, requires turning outwards. It ends in philosophers finding the whole
world beautiful (desirable) but forgetting that they are the cause of this beauty.
Nietzsche begins Beyond Good and Evil by posing “the problem of the value of truth,” i.e.,
the question of what could make “truth in itself” desirable (BGE 1). He believes that the value of
truth, what makes it desirable, is something projected onto the truth by the philosophers
themselves. To make the world appear beautiful is, Nietzsche says, to make it one’s own image
(TI IX 19). To make the world in one’s own image is, Nietzsche also says, the most fundamental
nature of philosophy (BGE 9). In fact, what Nietzsche most respects about philosophers is that
they can create systems of valuation, giving meaning to things. The danger of asceticism is real,
however, and so Nietzsche must remind philosophers that it is they who have made the truths they
value and desire valuable, desirable, beautiful. Nietzsche must therefore balance two conflicting
tasks, if he wishes to promote the development of philosophers: the need to goad would-be
philosophers outwards and upwards along the ladder of love and the need to cultivate respect for
the creative potential within. The latter task requires that Nietzsche remind these philosophers that
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lovers, even lovers of truth, are artists who create for themselves what it is that they love (GS 59). 21
Returning to the problem of Nietzsche’s ambivalence about whether philosophers are like
women or men, it is now evident that the ambivalence results from Nietzsche’s conception of a
philosopher’s development. In Nietzsche’s story and in Diotima’s, it is not the beautiful beloved
who gives birth, but rather the lover. To reach the point of being ready to give birth, the philosopher
must engage in what Nietzsche sees as a hypermasculine pursuit of what he desires. This masculine
position requires a negative stance toward the self, as the philosopher projects the qualities that he
most desires outwards, onto external things. In the hope of preparing the way for a philosopher of
the future, Nietzsche suggests a warriorlike approach to philosophical eroticism, as in the epigraph
before GM III (taken from Thus Spoke Zarathustra), “Carefree, mocking, violent–thus wisdom
wants us: she is a woman, she always loves only a warrior.” Yet the ultimate aim of philosophy is
to give birth. In order to do that honestly and probably in order to do that best, the philosopher
must recognize her own potency. This is the sort of life-affirmation that Nietzsche associates with
motherhood and femininity. The philosopher therefore must contain both the genius of begetting
and the genius of giving birth (BGE 206). Nietzsche is suggesting that the philosopher can be both
halves of a reproductive pair. He associates these two roles with masculinity and femininity,
respectively, and thus his comments on masculinity and femininity reflect the fact that he sees
these two roles as both important, yet in tension and conflict with one another (and that he sees
something of each in himself).
One way to interpret what Nietzsche is saying is that the philosopher’s ascent involves
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One example of how Nietzsche walks this tightrope is his use of the aphorism. For Nietzsche there is a connection
between the esotericism of aphorisms and the desire for truth. As Jill Marsden says, a Nietzschean aphorism “awaits
a catalyzing power that only the reader can supply” (Marsden 2006: 31). The esoteric nature of the aphorism (an
esoteric nature also present, more subtly, in Nietzsche’s non-aphoristic writings) does two things: (1) it provokes
philosophical desire by implying that a truth lies behind the exoteric text but it also (2) prompts the reader into an
active stance more conducive to recognizing the role of her own creative ability in the pursuit of such truth.
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what is characterized as masculine behavior, but that the final destination reached is the feminine
condition of pregnancy and giving birth. This picture seems to fit with the late preface to HAH,
for example, in which “volcanically erupting desire” (HAH P 3), successful avoidance of the
danger that the spirit may “become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or
other” (HAH P 4), “wandering,” hardness,” and “self-alienation,” (HAH P 5) all unconsciously
pave the way for pregnancy (HAH P 7). In Diotima’s picture, however, erotic pursuit, pregnancy,
and birth, are present at each stage of the ascent: at the apex of the ascent one can give birth to true
virtue (212a), but at earlier stages in the ascent one can give birth to ideas, theories, and speeches
(210c-d). We might interpret Nietzsche similarly, so that the masculine and feminine forms of
genius are both necessary parts of the philosopher, but neither represents the ultimate conclusion
of the process. In other words, we might take Nietzsche’s view of pursuit, pregnancy, and birth to
be episodic. Nietzsche does characterize the “war” between the sexes as eternal, and in his
discussion of the the Hellenic mysteries he associates “procreation, pregnancy, and birth” with
“the eternal return of life” (TI X 4). In the Preface to The Gay Science Nietzsche compares his
production of the book to both a long period of pregnancy followed by giving birth (GS Preface
3) and to a long winter followed by “April weather” (GS Preface 1), suggesting a cyclical sort of
philosophical production. If the philosopher’s act of giving birth is something like creating an
image of a world that is desirable, then this would be something that takes place throughout the
ascent, and in fact spurs the ascent onwards.

6

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I want to identify some of what is missing from my account. The
interpretation I have put forward ignores and elides a great deal of Nietzsche’s nuance. It also does
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not say much about Nietzsche’s views on actual women and their social and political position. The
fact that Nietzsche thinks men are capable of taking on and should take on feminine characteristics
and “female” responsibilities and that women can do the inverse (e.g., GS 72 and HAH I 425)
might suggest an understanding of gender as mutable. Such a conception of gender seems to fit
with the possibility both that women could be philosophers and with the broader notion that there
is nothing preordained about the fact of women’s oppression. On the other hand, the fact that
Nietzsche equates women, pregnancy, and passivity seems crudely reductionist and sexist.
Moreover, Nietzsche opposed equal rights for women (just as he opposed equal rights in general)
and seemed to think that the domination of women by men was ultimately in the best interests of
women. I have not been able to say much about how these facts relate to what Nietzsche says about
men and women, masculinity and femininity, in the context of philosophy. One thing I think is
clear is that Nietzsche’s normative views on the relationship between men and women are
informed by his understanding of how desire and reproduction are best promoted. Given
Nietzsche’s view that entire civilizations are justified by only a few great individuals, I suspect
that much of his position on men and women in society and politics can be understood by referring
back to the conditions that he thinks are necessary for the development of philosophers.

23
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbey, Ruth. 1996. “Beyond misogyny and metaphor: Women in Nietzsche's middle period.”
Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (2): 233–256.
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. 1992. “Who is the Übermensch? Time, Truth, and Woman in
Nietzsche.” Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (2): 309–331.
–––1993. “Nietzsche, woman and political theory.” In Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory,
edited by Paul Patton, 27-48. London: Allen & Unwin.
Clark, Maudemarie. 2015. “Nietzsche’s Misogyny.” In Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, 141–
150. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––2015. “On Queering Nietzsche.” In Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, 151–163. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
–––2017. “Will to power and sexuality in Nietzsche’s account of the ascetic ideal.” Inquiry 60,
no. 1-2: 96–134.
Conway, Daniel. 1993. “Das Weib an sich: The slave revolt in epistemology.” In Nietzsche,
Feminism and Political Theory, edited by Paul Patton, 110–129. London: Allen &
Unwin.
Cooper, John M. 1997. “Symposium.” In Plato Complete Works, translated by A. Nehamas and
P. Woodruff, 157–234. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Derrida, Jacques. 1979. Spurs, translated by Barbara Harlow. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Diethe, Carol. 1996. “Nietzsche and the Early German Feminists.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies
12: 69–81.
Fine, Jonathan. 2020. “The Guise of the Beautiful: Symposium 204d ff.” Phronesis 65 (2): 129–
152.
Forber, Patrick. 2013. “Biological Inheritance and Cultural Evolution in Nietzsche's Genealogy.”
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (2): 329–341.
Foucault, Michel. 1984. The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, translated by
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.
–––1998. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, edited by
James D. Faubion, 369–391. New York: The New Press.

24
Gemes, Ken. 2009. “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38: 38–
59.
Guay, Robert. 2011. “Genealogy and Irony.” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 41: 26–49.
Helm, Barbara. 2004. “Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century
German Feminists.” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27: 64–84.
Kauffmann, Walter. 1948. “Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates.” Journal of the History of
Ideas 9 (4): 472–491.
Kofman, Sarah. 1988. “Baubô: theological perversion and fetishism.” In Nietzsche’s New Seas
translated by T. B. Strong, edited by M.A. Gillespie and T.B. Strong. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Lampert, Laurence. 1996. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Loeb, Paul S. 2019. “Genuine Philosophers, Value-Creation, and Will to Power: An Exegesis of
Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil §211.” In Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy, edited by Paul
S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer, 83–105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marsden, Jill. 2006. “Nietzsche and the Art of the Aphorism.” In A Companion to Nietzsche,
edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson, 22–37. Mallen: Blackwell Publishing
Moore, Gregory. 2002. Nietzsche, Biology, and Metaphor. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1864. “On the Relationship of Alcibiades’ Speech to the Rest of the
Speeches in the Symposium.” Translated by Andy Davis, in Sophia and Philosophia 1,
Issue 1, Article 7.
Obdrzalek, S. 2010. “Moral Transformation and the Love of Beauty in Plato’s
‘Symposium.’” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4): 415–444.
Oppel, Frances Nesbitt. 2005. Nietzsche on Gender. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
–––1993. “‘Speaking of Immemorial Waters’ Irigaray with Nietzsche.” In Nietzsche, Feminism
and Political Theory, edited by Paul Patton, 88–109. London: Allen & Unwin.
Pippin, Robert. 2001. “Morality as Psychology, Psychology as Morality: Nietzsche, Eros, and
Clumsy Lovers.” In Nietzsche’s Postmoralism, edited by Richard Schacht, 79–99.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, John. 2002. “Nietzsche Contra Darwin.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 65 (3): 537–575.

25
Robson, James. 2013. Sex and Sexuality in Classical Athens. Edinburgh University Press.
Strauss, Leo. 1973. “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil.” Reprinted in Leo
Strauss and Nietzsche, Laurence Lampert, 1996, 188–205. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Vasseleu, Cathryn. 1993. “Not drowning, sailing: Women and the artist’s craft in Nietzsche.” In
Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, edited by Paul Patton, 71–87. London: Allen
& Unwin.
Nietzsche Translations
Beyond Good and Evil. 2002. Translated by Judith Norman, edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and
Judith Norman. Cambridge University Press.
Daybreak. 1997. Edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, translated by R.J. Hollingdale.
Cambridge University Press.
Ecce Homo. 2005. In The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings,
translated by Judith Norman, edited by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman. Cambridge
University Press.
Human, All Too Human. 1986. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge University Press.
On the Genealogy of Morality. 1998. Translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen.
Hackett Publishing Company.
The Birth of Tragedy. 2000. Translated by Douglas Smith. Oxford World’s Classics.
The Gay Science. 2001. Translated by Josefine Nauckhoff, edited by Bernard Williams.
Cambridge University Press.
Twilight of the Idols. 2005. In The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other
Writings, translated by Judith Norman, edited by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman.
Cambridge University Press.

